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THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN EUROPE 
Tel. 
It may seem at first sight odd that in Chicago, in the centre of your great 
continent, I should be talking to you about the apparently remote subject of 
European integration. But in the first place it is what my job is concerned with. 
~d secondly Chicago and American industry centred in Illinois and neighbouring 
states are now, thanks to the St. Lawrence Seaway, part of the Atlantic area. 
They have spread their manufacture and distribution throughout the world, but 
especially in Western Europe. So the subject I have chosen is a natural one to 
discuss here. 
I am confident, this being Chicago, that a good number of people in my 
audience work for those same U.S. corporations which are now large investors and 
manufacturers in Western Europe. They are very well informed about the European 
situation, so they will sympathise with me in h~ving to discuss this very difficult 
subject. I know they will also agree with me that the story of European integra-
tion is inevitably told here in terms of its difficulties. its quarrels and its 
personalities, The result is that what is really happening ~eldom gets across the 
Atlantic. So let me first remind you of what has happened in the integration of 
the economies of Western Europe in the period since the end of the war. 
You will recall that we were in a pretty poor state in the immediate post-war 
years. Industrial production was at a very low level, either because the capacity 
to produce had been destroyed, or because it had worked without maintenance for 
many years and was desperately in need of repair and replacement. The same was 
true of food production and that aspect of the situation was worsened by a series 
of bad harvests. As a result of all this, there was a danger that some countries 
in Western Europe would yield to Communist minorities and would be lost to the 
Western camp. 
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It was in those circumstances that the historic Marshall Plan was launched, 
the plan which not only enabled Western Europe quickly to recapture and to surpass 
its pre-war levels of prosperity, but also to begin the economic integration 
procsss. The Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was the 
instrument created to share out the U.S. aid and to decide priorities. In a very 
short time the OEEC, which was a co-operative of 16 governments, also got rid of 
the network of quota and exchange restrictions which were stifling European trade 
and created a new multi-lateral clearing system which enabled our countries to 
emerge from the straitjacket of near-barter arrangements in which they found 
themselves as a consequence of the war. 
The success of the OEEC made it possible to be more bold and in the late 50s 
we saw the creation of the European Economic Community, or the Common Market, as 
it is usually known here. The Common Market, hrn,ever, consisted of only six 
Western European countries. Seven others which are situated in a sort of ring 
round the Common Market - Britain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria 
and Portugal - were very concerned about this. They did not wish to be left 
behind in the process of economic integration. But for various reasons they 
would not or could not sign the Treaty of Rome which had brought the Common 
Market into being. To make a long story short, the seven got together in the 
European Free Trade Association, or EFTA. A year later, Finland became an EFTA 
associate, playing her full part in creating the free trade area. The Seven did 
not see EFTA as a permanent organisation, but thought it would enable them to keep 
up with the process of economic integration in Europe until such time as an 
arrangement could be reached with the Common Market countries to make all of 
Western Europe a single market. 
All this was very rapid progress. Two trading groups in Western Europe 
are, of course, one too many. But two large markets are much better than the 14 
separate national markets which existed before the Common Market and EFTA came 
into being. What Western Europe was really doing was to copy the U.S. formula 
for prosperity, creating large markets as the basis for production and distri-
bution units on a scale appropriate to the second half of this century. 
It must be said that the formula has been a great success. Trade between the 
six countries of the Common Market has multiplied four times since 1960 and in the 
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same period trade between the EFTA countries has almost trebled. Although the two 
groups are separated by a tariff wall, they have nonetheless doubled their trade 
with each other in the past decade. This has naturally been accompanied by rapid 
growth of the economies of all the countries concerned, so that real standards of 
living of their peoples have on the average almost doubled over the past ten years. 
In its turn, this greater prosperity in Western Europe has been very profitable to 
our trading partners in the rest of the world, and particularly to the United States. 
Last year, for example, United States exports to the EFTA countries were 120% higher 
than in 1960. At the same time, U.S. corporations have found the two big European 
markets a natural environment and a very hospitable one. Since 1960 direct invest-
ment by your industries in Western Europe have grown from $6 billion to $20 billion. 
Thu~ it is now the situation that the European production of U.S. companies already 
exceeds U.S. exports to Europe by a considerable margin. 
This is the real picture of what economic integration has done for our 
countries. Comp~red with such levels of achievement, the more sensational stories 
of disputes and difficulties shrink into the proper perspective. 
How did we go r:bout creating these new Europeccn m:1rkets? The :mswer is 
basically the same for the Common Mark~t ::i.s for the Free Tr~de Area. The main tech-
nique in both trading groups was to dismantle trade barriers to zero on an agreed 
timetable. For example, in EFTA we agreed in 1960 th~t 311 tariff and quota restric-
tions on trade between our member countries would disappear by 1970, with the excep-
tion of Portugal, which wns allowed a much longer period. In fact we got to zero at 
the end of 1966, 18 months before the Common Market renched the same objective. 
Effectively therefore, eRch of the EFTA countries h::i.s had a home market of 100 million 
people for the past several years and this has enabled our producers and traders to 
make their plans on a new basis. Of course, the Common M~rket countries had from the 
beginning a much more ambitious scenario than ours. A_q the name implies, they set up 
a common external tariff, whereas in the Free Trade Area each country keeps its own 
external tariff towards other countries. The Common Market is aiming at an economic 
union) which demands far more of its member countries in the sense of seeking to 
harmonise their economic policies right across the board. And the Common Market also 
sought a single agricultur~l regime for the entire are~, which EFTA did not. 
In addition to getting rid of tariffs and quotas, we have also attacked all 
non-tariff barriers to trade. This is a long and difficult business and we have 
already been working on it for the past five years. We have made considerable 
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progress. B~sides ridding ourselves of government ,'l..nd private regul.3tions 2nd 
pro.ctices which hampered the grm,1th of trade in EFTAJ we h2ve developed over the 
yenrs rules of competition •;;,1hich t!.ttempt to ensure that eo.ch of our countries 
plays fair with the othera i!l na.ttcrs of tr~dc. It is of gren.t interest to our 
governments thnt ~ review of non-to.riff barriers on o. worlcl sco.le is now beginning 
in the GATT. The EFTA countries 9-re very reGdy to tr!.ke p,::rt in a negotintion of 
non-to.riff barriers and the experience we have gnincd in EFTA should be useful on 
a much wider scale.. 
The objective of ~11 this, of course, was to ~~kc a genuine single m2rket in 
EFTA and I think we c:1n claim that we have, succc,eded. There will alwnys be grey 
~reas where disagreement persists, but these ere tiny things compared to the 
gencr3.l t'..lchicvement. The same cnn be said, nt le<lSt concerning trnde in manu-
factured goods, of the Common Mnrket. 
Nrnv l~t me lt.:.:c?.ve firm ground nnd speculate· about the prospects for the near 
future.. Only too often this question is over-simplified, and becomes merely a 
matter of whether Brit2in will enter the Common Market. The answer to that 
qu.estion is only part of n much larger problem. Let me, try to give you the 
broader background. 
Western Europe is in fc1ct an inter-dependent economic unit. Whether coun-
trio2s are NATO members} independents, neutrals by choice~ or ncutr::i.ls by compul-
sion, they nre still p2.rt of thn.t unit. The split into two tr~ding groups may 
blur the picture here P'..Ud there bn:t it does not ch:m8e the b2.sic unitary situation. 
For example, the EFTl,. countries' export:' to their free. trnde nrca p:1.rtncrs .3.re 
now running ~t about $10 billion n. yee.r. Their trr!.clLc ,;,1ith the six countries of 
thc Common Market is of the. same order of nwgni tud..::-, which means that, from the 
EFT.A point of view, tr.:1de with th(.'. Six is just .'1.s important today ns is tr~de 
within EFT:~. For individunl countries, trn.dc with the other group is 3Ctually 
more importnnt them trnde with EFTA. For ex,:.mplc, Austrir•. 2nd Switzerlnnd export 
almost twice as much to the Common Mr,rket n.s they do to EFT/). 2.nd Britc:i.in exports 
50% more to the Common Me.rkct thnn shl'! docs to EFTA - whi.2rens West Germany, 
which is in the Common l1ark2t, sells to the EFTA countri2s about twice. as much as 
Britnin, which is in EFTJ\. 
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You will therefore find it easy to understand that the businessmen of Western 
Europe have attached great importance to any moves towards doing away with the 
split into two trading groups. The split has indeed only endured so long because 
of political arguments which, however important they seemed to their exponents, 
are irrelevant to the economic integration process. Although businessmen could 
not break the political deadlock, they could and did try to proceed with their 
affairs so as to minimise its effects. As I have already shown, they continued 
to trade in increasing volume across the border between the groups. They con-
tinued to invest and to build subsidiaries in the other group, thus binding the 
two together in an ever-lighter web of economic relations. 
Moreover, European industry often acted as a whole to prevent important 
matters from being settled on a narrow basis. For example, they did not seek 
agreement on common industrial standards on the basis of the Six or the Seven. 
They continued to press for the same standards all over Western Europe. Nor was 
this attitude confined to the private sector. Governments also took the same 
viL'W. One of the reasons why the EFTA countries so actively strove for the 
maximum results from the Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations was because success 
in that endeavour would reduce the height of the tariff wall between EFTA and the 
Common Market and make the split less harmful to trade. 
The question of patents is another example. As in all industrial countries, 
the patent issuing organisations of Europe are snowed under with applications for 
patents and the situation cries out for simplification. At this moment that need 
is being studied jointly by 17 countries including the members of the Common 
Harket and EFTA, with experts from both groups sitting round the same table to 
draft a new European patent arrangement whereby a single application and search 
will suffice for the applicant to obtain a patent in 17 countries. Moreover, in 
seeking this agreement the countries concerned are being careful to keep it com-
patible with the broader world-wide patent reform which is simultaneously being 
sought through the international organisation responsible for such mutters. We 
are not seeking to arrive at patent arrangements which would exclude the United 
States. On the contrary, whatever arrangements are made in Europe will be open 
on equal terms to other countries. 
The same is true of European scientific and technological co-operation. 
There are many important fields in which action on the basis of the Common Market 
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or EFTA separately would be nonsensical. The Common Market governments who have 
been studying a report on technology, suggesting vnrious common projects, have 
very recently invited the EFTA governments to participate. This offer has been 
welcomed in the last few days, but it is too soon to say how this will all 
develop. 
Yet another example is to be found in the work being carried out by the EFTA 
governments in further reducing barriers to trade. They consciously try to avoid 
decisions which would aggravate the split between the two groups. They have 
always in mind the day, which cannot now be far distant, when all of Western 
Europe will be united in a single market. 
I am not going to risk forecasting what form that single market may take. 
It is uncertain how far the many countries will be willing to pool their sovereignty 
by adopting genuinely unified policies. It is uncertain also what the scope of 
those common policies will be, and especially whether they will go beyond economic 
integration towards political unity. It is uncertain, finally, whether governments 
will allow the process of decision-making to pQss, in any important sense, to an 
independent, supra-national authority. And upon the outcome of these developments 
will depend, in turn, the choice, by each country of Western Europe, whether it 
wishes to become a full member of the new grouping, or instead will prefer to be 
associated with it by links shaped to meet its particular economic or political 
situation. 
But among all these uncertainties about the future of European integration 
there is, I believe, one near-certainty. Although the road we will follow is 
unmapped, it will lead us forward, not back. It is inconceivable to me that the 
trade barriers we have torn d<:Mn between our countries will be re-erected. And 
the groundswell of integration is so powerful that it surely cannot fail to 
carry us much further on. Within ten years - perhnps sooner - Western Europe 
should form one wealthy market of 300 million people, a unit large enough to 
stand with the United States. It will not, of course, be a homogeneous market. 
The national and local differences which ~i ve I:urope its chnrn as ,:,1ell ~s its 
frustrations will continue to present their own special challenges. But it will 
be a market, nevertheless, on a truly continental scale: a scale which will 
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permit business to operate with a much greater efficiency. It offers Europe's 
citizens the prospect of greater economic stability, greater prosperity, and 
the chance to play a fuller role in the world. And it offers American business, 
which has so much to contribute, perhaps its greatest opportunities in these 
closing decades of the twentieth century. 
